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Capabilities-Based Defense Planning: Techniques Applicable 
to NATO and Partnership for Peace Countries 
Thomas-Durell Young ∗ 
Defense planning, even at its best, is an inexact science. Objective data that demon-
strate how well (or poorly) existing and future capabilities will perform on operations 
as envisaged in the planning process are difficult to come by. And, despite the fact that 
countries are willing to spend inordinate sums on defense capabilities, the academic 
and professional literature that addresses defense planning qua planning is modest, in 
stark contrast with the literature on business planning.1 Perhaps unjustified concerns by 
ministries of defense over the security of information, or simply a lack of general inter-
est by students in the field of strategic studies, have—singularly or combined—pro-
duced a rather anemic body of literature dealing with defense planning methodologies. 
This lack of an objective and normative body of literature on this subject should not, 
however, be allowed to dissuade defense officials and planners from examining extant 
approaches to defense planning. To be sure, the range of methodologies from which 
                                                           
∗ Thomas-Durrell Young, Cert., Ph.D., Dipl., is Senior Lecturer and Program Manager for 
Europe at the Center for Civil-Military Relations at the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School in 
Monterey. The views expressed in this essay are those of the author and do not necessarily 
reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Navy, Department of Defense, 
or the U.S. Government. 
1 The discipline of strategic studies, albeit a relatively new specialty in the field of interna-
tional relations, is surely an oddity. While exceedingly rich in most areas, the literature of 
strategic studies has all but ignored addressing, in any generic and systematic sense, the basic 
issue of how nations should best conduct defense planning. The extant literature on “defense 
planning,” which is indeed prodigious, typically addresses a single country’s experience 
while ignoring any cross-national analysis of methods, let alone attempting to offer generic 
methodologies that can be adopted by governments, either in their entirety or piecemeal. 
Surprisingly, there is not a single work in the extant literature that provides a theoretical ap-
proach to defense planning, management, and execution, either for didactic purposes, or for 
application by a government. Instead, particularly in the context of U.S. professional military 
education, curricula are often developed from source materials that are neither intellectually 
nor academically rigorous, given their bureaucratic genesis. Moreover, as countries under-
take defense reform efforts—a rather prevalent practice, given that the end of the Cold War 
spawned a large number of young and fragile democracies—there is simply a dearth of work 
that contains a comprehensive presentation of all of the key contingent elements of defense 
planning that could serve as an appropriate guide or even template for emulation. This lack 
of a generic planning approach has a number of debilitating characteristics, not the least of 
which is that, without such a template, it is exceedingly difficult to demonstrate the benefits 
of integration, a sine qua non for an efficient and effective planning and execution system. 
Given that almost all countries have ministries of defense and defense forces, which regularly 
undergo restructuring and reform, the lack of any rigorous treatment of how nations can im-
prove their planning, management, and execution of the mission of national defense is a sig-
nificant lacuna in the professional and academic literature.  
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one might select may be modest; however, there are sufficient examples of successful 
planning systems to be studied for emulation. 
The present writer has had the unusual opportunity to be able to combine a period 
of formal academic study with program management responsibilities in the area of de-
fense planning reform.2 Given the objective of this special edition of Connections on 
Partnership Action Plan on Defense Institution Building (PAP-DIB),3 instead of 
addressing a specific case of defense planning reform, this essay will introduce a plan-
ning methodology that is discussed (and apparently emulated) but is little understood, 
particularly as regards its more nuanced aspects. The planning methodology under 
consideration is “capabilities-based planning.” Again, a remarkable fact is that, despite 
its apparent popularity, the academic and practical literature on capabilities-based 
planning is modest at best, and non-existent at worst. One might speculate that one ex-
planation for this gap is due to the fact that this methodology appears to be relatively 
new to North America and Europe. After all, until the early 1990s, NATO and Warsaw 
Pact countries largely employed variations on threat-based planning—on which there 
is, not surprisingly, a rather large literature. The excesses of this form of defense plan-
ning were, perforce, limited by resource constraints.4 However, a Euro-centric myopia 
in this area can result in overlooking a particular instance where one advanced Western 
defense establishment undertook, over numerous years of trial and error, the develop-
ment of a capabilities-based planning methodology. While this is not widely known in 
NATO and Partnership for Peace countries, Australia experimented with capabilities-
based planning—that is, planning that is not based on identifiable or quantifiable 
threats, but rather on the capabilities already present in its armed forces—for over two 
decades as the basis for designing its force structure.5 
By the end of the 1980s, after many false starts, the Australian Department of De-
fense, including the Headquarters Australian Defense Force (HQADF), had developed 
principles and processes for guiding force development that reflected government 
strategy and guidance to defend the country, while giving less weight to “threats.” In 
their place, “credible contingencies” were created that were based on capabilities 
rather than on existing threats. The result of these efforts has been to create a unique 
                                                           
2 See, for example, Aldo Kask, Jaan Murumets, and Thomas-Durell Young, Approaching the 
Need for Defense Reform: Background and Outlines of Suggested Estonian Defense Plan-
ning System, Proceedings 1 (Tartu: Estonian National Defense College, 2003). 
3 Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, “Partnership Action Plan on Defense Institution Build-
ing” (PAP-DIB), (Brussels: NATO Information Service, 7 June 2004).  
4 For an early attempt to provide NATO defense officials with new planning principles and 
guidelines, see Ted Greenwood and Stuart Johnson, “NATO Force Planning without the So-
viet Threat,” Parameters 22:1 (Spring 1992): 27–37.  
5 For instance, in a submission before the Australian Parliament’s Joint Committee on Foreign 
Affairs, Defense and Trade, the Department of Defense claimed that the 1971 Strategic Basis 
paper acknowledged that Australia needed to pursue its own security interests through 
greater individual effort than had previously been the case. See Australia, Parliament, Joint 
Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defense and Trade, The Management of Australia’s Defense 
(Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service [AGPS], 1987), 22–23.  
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methodology that made the development of the Australian Defense Force (ADF) more 
relevant to Australia’s enduring strategic circumstances. At the same time, the ADF 
become more responsive to government guidance and less influenced by particularly 
service-specific interests and problematic threat scenarios. Thus, the relevance of the 
Australian experience is that it established guidelines against which the ADF could 
conceivably operate in a non-threat-specific environment, while making adequate pro-
vision for other important planning factors, such as financial limitations. 
Notwithstanding the unique characteristics of Australia’s geo-strategic situation, the 
overriding policy requirement that Australian defense planners should come to terms 
with a threat-ambiguous environment is broadly similar to the imperative now faced by 
many NATO and PfP countries in the post-Cold War world. Therefore, an examination 
of the Australian capabilities-based methodology is more than apropos to the subject of 
PAP-DIB. As such, the purpose of this essay is to describe the Australian defense 
planning system and its force development methodologies, concluding with an analysis 
of the lessons learned from Australia that might be useful to other countries. While not 
all aspects of the process will be relevant elsewhere, the twenty-plus years of experi-
ence of the Australian Department of Defense warrants careful examination. At the 
least, an understanding of this planning methodology could spare defense planners in 
NATO and PfP nations from making the mistakes that bedeviled their Australian 
counterparts. 
The Defense Planning Process: Content and Outputs 
Any sound defense planning and force development system can only be successfully 
implemented if there is a modicum of stated and clear government policy to guide 
planners. To be sure, it is folly for any defense planner to wait for such guidance to be 
provided in formal documents. Inevitably, it is left to planners to discern guidance 
from a wide variety of sources, both obvious and obscure. For instance, important 
guidance for defense planning can be gleaned from such varied sources as a nation’s 
constitution, its defense laws, speeches made by elected government officials, and even 
press interviews. Indeed, my experience leads to the conclusion that usefulness of these 
other sources of guidance and priorities can far exceed that of poorly-executed and 
public relations-oriented national policy documents. In the end, guidance and priorities 
need to be promulgated in Ministry of Defense-level policy documents that, inevitably, 
will include such principles as defense of national sovereignty (and, in the NATO 
context, collective sovereignty), participation in crisis-response operations, etc. 
Following the arrival at a clearer understanding of the nation’s defense policy guid-
ance and priorities, Australian defense planners established four major steps to be fol-
lowed in the defense policy process, which will be described generically below.6 Some 
                                                           
6 For background on Australia’s defense planning methodology during the period in question, 
see Paul Dibb, The Conceptual Basis of Australia’s Defense Planning and Force Structure 
Development, Canberra Paper on Strategy and Defense No.88 (Canberra: Strategic and De-
fense Studies Centre, Australian National University, 1992).  
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aspects of this planning process particularly reflect Australia’s singular geo-strategic 
situation, and will therefore be only briefly explained. 
First, defense planners need to recognize the fundamentals of a country’s geopoliti-
cal and geo-strategic setting. While seemingly obvious, a nation’s unique geographic 
characteristics, such as proximity to other countries, population centers, and infra-
structure, need be carefully considered in a disciplined and systematic fashion. For in-
stance, in the particular case of Australia, defense planners are confronted with de-
fending an island continent, distant from other countries, that has a vast and climati-
cally inhospitable northern area with limited population and infrastructure. The country 
also has the advantage of possessing a formidable “air-sea gap” between its northern 
shores and the islands to its north, which a potential enemy would have to overcome if 
it wished to threaten Australia.7 
Second, it is necessary for planners to develop a disciplined and systematic appre-
ciation of the capabilities of the armed forces—both those currently in service and 
those likely to be procured in the future—possessed by regional states. Officially, these 
are not threat assessments, but rather surveys of regional defense capabilities, current 
and anticipated.8 Given the nature of the contemporary security environment in the 
Euro-Atlantic region, a solely geographically-oriented survey could well be replaced 
by a formal appreciation of terrorist capabilities, the likelihood of natural disasters, etc. 
In the Australian case, these appreciations were based simply on regional capabilities 
and did not involve any consideration of (or judgments about) the motives or intentions 
of other countries in the region. An appreciation of a country’s geographic setting and 
the military capabilities of regional states produce, in effect, warning time and defense 
preparation requirements.9 
                                                           
7 “The area of direct military interest includes Australia, its territories and proximate ocean ar-
eas, Indonesia, Papua New Guinea, New Zealand and other nearby countries of the South-
west Pacific.” See Australian Department of Defense, Defense of Australia 1987 (Canberra: 
AGPS, 1987), 2, n. l; and, more generally, 1–3; 74. Note that this policy of self-reliance does 
not mean that Australia plans to be self-sufficient in terms of the manufacturing and supply 
of all defense-related equipment and stocks. See Strategic Review 1993 (Canberra: Depart-
ment of Defense, December 1993), 75–77. Note that this document superseded Australia’s 
Strategic Planning in the 1990s (Canberra: Department of Defense, 27 November 1989).  
8 While those Australian defense officials interviewed emphatically argued that these apprecia-
tions were not threat assessments, references to “intelligent adversaries” and the country’s 
“favorable security environment” pre-suppose an evaluation of a “threat,” no matter how ill 
defined. Australian defense officials responded to this observation by stating that their meth-
odology did not allow “threats” to dominate or overly influence their force development 
methodology.  
9 See Dibb, Conceptual Basis, 1–8.  
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Third, by combining the findings from the first two steps, a series of credible con-
tingencies and national defense requirements can be generated.10 A credible contin-
gency, in effect, is that level of contingency possible given Australia’s geo-strategic 
circumstances and current and foreseeable regional military capabilities, without con-
sideration of motive or intent. Essential elements of these analyses are the capabilities 
possessed by regional states, their strategic doctrine, level of training and sustainabil-
ity; the analyses also include an appreciation of the level of conflict one could reasona-
bly expect to confront (e.g., low, low-escalated, medium, etc.).11 
Australian defense planners argued that these contingencies were not employed as 
formal threat-based contingency planning, but were developed to produce a baseline 
against which a country’s defense capabilities could be measured in the immediate 
term. Credible contingencies had a direct influence on developing the ADF’s capabili-
ties to meet levels of conflict that could arise in the near term, and the defense expan-
sion base (i.e., reserve forces and expansion of defense industrial capabilities) for con-
flicts that would take longer to develop.12 
Fourth, and finally, financial assumptions were introduced. These data were essen-
tial to enable the Australian Department of Defense to develop a five-year planning ho-
rizon to support and guide force development plans. A key purpose of the defense 
planning process is to provide vetted force development priorities derived from spe-
cific requirements, as opposed to championing “worthy causes.” An estimate of the fi-
nancial resources available for the near future, therefore, is extremely useful for plan-
ning purposes. However, particularly in many new NATO members and reforming PfP 
                                                           
10 For greater explanation of credible contingencies see Dibb, ibid., 9–15. Note that these 
analyses would appear to be similar to the illustrative planning scenarios employed in the 
U.S. Joint Strategic Planning System. These scenarios suggest, for illustrative purposes, 
situations in which the United States, perhaps with allies and partners, becomes embroiled in 
conflict with hypothetical adversaries. These scenarios were described in the Defense Plan-
ning Guidance (more recently re-titled as Strategic Planning Guidance) as manifesting mili-
tary challenges that might be addressed during the Future Years Defense Program. It must be 
noted, however, that these scenarios are neither predictive, nor exhaustive, regarding those 
challenges; nor are envisaged as reflecting policy decisions. These caveats aside, these sce-
narios purportedly illustrate the types of military capabilities needed, enable Department of 
Defense (DoD) components to perform detailed program planning, provide a basis for en-
suring consistency among various DoD component programs, and serve as analytical tools 
and a base-line for evaluating component programs after they are submitted. See Douglas C. 
Lovelace and Thomas-Durell Young, U.S. Department of Defense Strategic Planning: The 
Missing Nexus (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 1 
September 1995), pp. 7–8, 19-21. 
11 Levels of conflict, in Australian usage, are: low-level, escalated low-level, and more substan-
tial conflict. These were defined by Paul Dibb in his Review of Australia’s Defense Capa-
bilities (Canberra: AGPS, March 1986), 53–54. Escalated low-level conflict was publicly 
defined by the Australian government as “the attacker supplementing or substituting uncon-
ventional tactics and forces with military units prepared to confront our forces directly.” See 
The Defense of Australia (1987), 24–25.  
12 See Dibb, Review of Australia’s Defense Capabilities, 16–20. 
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nations, such guidance is unlikely. Therefore, financial assumptions will likely need to 
be developed with a given nation’s Ministry of Defense solely for internal planning 
purposes. 
To describe how this planning methodology is translated into reality in Australia, 
the process produces these conclusions: 
• Australia possesses an air-sea gap that is a natural and formidable barrier. 
• Australia’s regional security assessment is favorable because no identifiable 
country exists with the intent or ability to threaten fundamental Australian inter-
ests, let alone its national security (i.e., to launch and sustain an operation on 
Australian soil). 
• Certain countries do, however, possess capabilities that could be employed 
against Australia, and these nations’ acquisition of more threatening weapon 
systems could be countered by increasing the ADF’s capabilities. 
• In the short term and without expansion, such capabilities could be used only in 
low-level or escalated-low level conflict. 
• As a consequence, Australia will defend itself through a strategy of “defense in 
depth.” 
These conclusions concerning Australia’s geo-strategic environment produced the 
equivalent of a net assessment and established requirements for the ADF standing force 
structure and national defense infrastructure. For defense policy, the assessment had 
the following implications: 
1. Given Australia’s threat-ambiguous environment, sophisticated intelligence-
gathering and assessment capabilities are crucial to providing sufficient warning 
time for an appropriate political response to be made. Clearly, no (sane) govern-
ment is keen to spend any more than is necessary on national defense (a common 
theme in contemporary Europe). In consequence, it is assumed that if there exist 
sufficient intelligence capabilities, government will have sufficient time to act to 
develop additional capabilities to meet emerging threats. 
2. Inhibiting incursions and monitoring Australian sovereign territory and seas re-
quire sophisticated air, maritime, and ground surveillance and reconnaissance ca-
pabilities, suitable for peacetime and wartime deployment. 
3. Priority needs to be placed on building capabilities to meet low and escalated-
low, versus high, levels of conflict.13 
What this defense policy establishes, therefore, is a practice by which defense offi-
cials can approach the definition of missions without accentuating implausible threat 
scenarios. This is not always an easy objective to fulfill because it is dependent on a 
relatively high degree of consensus between ministries of defense and their subordi-
nated national defense headquarters—what is, in effect, a critical test of a country’s 
                                                           
13 See Strategic Review 1993, 41–49. 
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civil-military relations. In consequence, the above procedures provided Australian de-
fense planners with stable direction for developing force structure, which, in principle, 
structured the ADF for the defense of Australia and in a top-down manner. It should be 
stressed that, at that time, the sole determinant for structuring the ADF was for the de-
fense of Australia. While the ADF was envisioned as being capable of carrying out 
other missions—e.g., providing military support to civil authorities, acting in regional 
interventions, and carrying out alliance/global responsibilities—these tasks in them-
selves were not allowed to become force structure determinants.14 
Force Development Methodology  
The previous capabilities-based force development process employed by the Australian 
Department of Defense and HQADF was divided into three stages (see Figure 1).15 
However, because the process itself should be understood as a continuum, the distinc-
tions drawn between its three stages are somewhat arbitrary. The stages are: Stage I: 
Strategic Concepts; Stage 2: Defense Force Capability Options papers; and, Stage 3: 
Specific Capability Proposals, including Major Capability Submissions. Omitted from 
this analysis, for the sake of brevity, is any reference to the numerous joint-service and 
civilian-military committees that assess and adjudicate conflicting requirements and 
establish priorities throughout the development process. 
Stage 1: Development of Strategic Concepts 
Derived directly from the defense planning process, the force development process 
must first identify the missions the defense force is likely to be required to perform. In 
addition to constitutional, legal, and policy requirements, the environmental factors 
conditioning the identification of missions are: 
• Relevant key features of a country’s geo-strategic situation, such as geophysical 
aspects and other political, diplomatic, and legal considerations, including tech-
nological developments 
                                                           
14 Note that this provision has been the case for some time. The problem, however, was in its 
implementation prior to the late 1980s. See, Australia, Parliament, Joint Committee on For-
eign Affairs, Defense, The Australian Defense Force: Its Structure and Capabilities (Can-
berra: AGPS, 1984), 63. 
15 For an excellent explanation of this process, see the article by Frank Lewincamp, then-Direc-
tor of the Concepts and Capabilities, Force Development Branch, Department of Defense, 
“Strategic Guidance and Force Structure: The Force Development Process,” FDA Presenta-
tion to Acquisition and Logistics Project Management Course, Canberra, 21 July 1992. The 
process is fully explained in Australia, Department of Defense, Defense Instructions (Gen-
eral), ADMIN 05-1 (The Force Development Process), 23 December 1991, 3. A summary is 
found in Australia, Department of Defense, Concepts and Capabilities Section, Force Devel-
opment Branch, “The Force Development Process: From Strategic Guidance to Specific Ca-
pability Proposals–A Summary,” revised 6 May 1993. Note that all of these documents are 
unclassified.  
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• Current and projected regional military capabilities, including their nature and 
level of potential threat  
• Their potential employment by an intelligent adversary. 
A Strategic Concept developed from this analysis will consist of a list of derived 
tasks to support the identified mission of the Australian Defense Force, including: 
specification, in the greatest possible detail, of task parameters that include (but are not 
limited to) rates of effort, location, and duration/sustainability; and, wherever possible, 
initial judgments of task priorities. In short, Strategic Concepts specify the military 
tasks that will be needed to support identified missions that are likely to be required of 
the defense force. It is essential that these tasks be identified correctly and comprehen-
sively in the development process, because they will form the subsequent basis for 
force development. Once they have been articulated in Strategic Concepts, the tasks 
identified raise the following questions: 
• What has to be done? 
• Where must the task be done? 
• When and how many times must the task be done? 
• How long will the task have to be done? 
Note that, at this particular stage, tasks specified in Strategic Concepts are concep-
tual, and do not specify how missions are to be accomplished. For illustrative purposes, 
there were eight formal Strategic Concepts developed out of the Strategic Review 
1993, which clearly identified eight specific roles for the ADF.16 It is important to note 
that they were developed to ensure a joint force focus so as to complement the various 
service capabilities of the ADF. The eight Strategic Concepts were: 
1. Intelligence collection and evaluation 
2. Surveillance of maritime areas and northern Australia 
3. Maritime patrol and response 
4. Protection of shipping, offshore territories, and resources 
5. Air defense within Australia’s maritime areas and northern approaches 
                                                           
16 See Strategic Review 1993, 45; 61–67 (Annex A). Note that these were superseded following 
another review in 1997. The revised hierarchy was structured as:  
• Priority One: The knowledge edge (intelligence; command arrangements and command 
support systems; surveillance of our maritime approaches) 
• Priority Two: Defeating threats in our maritime approaches (air superiority; defeating 
ships) 
• Priority Three: Strike 
• Priority Four: Land forces (defeating hostile land forces on Australian territory; surveil-
lance of land targets; response).  
See Department of Defense, Australia’s Strategic Policy (Canberra: Directorate of Publish-
ing and Visual Communications, December 1997, DPUBS: 29785/97), 56–66. 
SPRING-SUMMER 2006 
 43
Figure 1: Defense Policy, Planning, and Programming System 
6. Defeat of incursions on Australian territory  
7. Protection of important civilian and defense assets, including infrastructure and 
population centers 
8. Strategic strike.17 
Strategic Concepts were never envisioned to be static, and were expected to be re-
viewed, revised, and revalidated over time as policy, technology, and the geo-strategic 
situation changed.18 Moreover, once all required Strategic Concepts were developed 
and endorsed, it was foreseen that one master Strategic Concept should be developed 
in order to provide macro-level context to the documents. 
                                                           
17 Cf. Australian Strategic Planning in the 1990s, 28–29. Note that developing a response to 
operations specific to “South Pacific nations” was dropped in the 1993 strategic review.  
18 See Department of Defense, “The Force Development Process: From Strategic Guidance to 
Specific Capability Proposals.”  
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Stage 2: Defense Force Capability Options Papers 
This particular stage in the planning methodology examines the extent to which current 
and approved ADF capabilities are sufficient to undertake the tasks identified in the 
endorsed Strategic Concepts. Where tasks cannot be completed to a level judged to be 
sufficient or adequate, an analysis is undertaken to ascertain which broad options 
should be considered for use in overcoming these deficiencies. (It should be noted that 
this is not an original methodology; its earliest origins can be found in the management 
reforms implemented in the U.S. Department of Defense during the McNamara era.19 
A key element of these reforms was the introduction of economic decision-making 
techniques to the capabilities-requirements process. In an ideal world, such analysis 
should be based upon clear metrics that measure performance, derived from the results 
of a formal operational planning process.20) This is an important step in the develop-
ment process because it forces the planning system to examine, in a joint service and 
civil-military context, what can be accomplished with current capabilities and, failing 
that, what new capabilities are genuinely necessary. 
The development of these analyses involves accomplishing the following steps:21 
1. Ascertain existing capabilities and assess whether they are relevant to the task in 
question. This analysis must estimate the performance likely to be achieved from 
using all existing capabilities. This finding is important because it will provide 
the baseline against which the cost of adjustment options can be measured. 
2. Make initial judgments about the acceptable level of performance of capabilities 
and assess the consequences of not being able to execute tasks to that level, i.e., 
does a deficiency need to be overcome? This analysis must also consider the 
likely operational implications of not being able to undertake the tasks com-
pletely. 
3. Explain how the defense force could reduce or limit the deficiency without major 
financial expenditure, i.e., cost-effective (involving little capital expenditure) 
adjustments such as changes in doctrine, organizational structures, or changes to 
existing command authorities and structures. 
4. If the defense force cannot fulfill a task identified in a Strategic Concept, the 
analysis must explain how it could acquire a higher level of proficiency by im-
proving its various components, e.g., increases in manpower, new equipment, ex-
panded individual/unit training, etc. 
                                                           
19 Charles J. Hitch and Roland N. McKean, The Economics of Defense in the Nuclear Age 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1960). 
20 NATO uses such a process for its members and Partnership for Peace nations: Allied Com-
mand Operations, Guidelines for Operational Planning (GOP), 1100/SHOPJ/0400-1-1321, 
June 2004.  
21 See Department of Defense, “The Force Development Process: From Strategic Guidance to 
Specific Capability Proposals.” 
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5. Estimate the expected level of improvement needed while assessing the resource 
implications of such changes in terms of the costs of any such enhancement op-
tions, as well as the possible consequences of not being able to perform the tasks 
to the level already judged acceptable. 
6. Finally, establish force development options and priorities based upon the 
preceding analyses that present the best return for expended resources. 
While perhaps lengthy and complicated, this process can be summed up briefly: 
• Can the identified tasks be performed now? (This is not only a question of what 
is present in the current capabilities inventory, but also how well this can be done 
at the time of the analysis.) 
• How much is enough? (If a surplus of capability exists, a decision must be made 
whether to reduce the current structure in order to shift excess capabilities else-
where—e.g., shift low-demand forces from the active force to reserve status. If 
existing capabilities are inadequate, identify where the discernible shortfall exists 
and what should be done to justify this shortfall.) 
• What are the costs and risks? (It should be remembered that costs can take the 
form of traditional financial costs, as well as “opportunity costs” to the armed 
forces; as such, they both need to be identified, quantified, and assessed). 
• What are the preferred generic options? (It is important that this process not rec-
ommend specific capabilities to fill identified gaps. For example, it would be ap-
propriate for such analyses to conclude that a defense force required improved air 
defense, or anti-armor capabilities. It would be inappropriate for these analyses to 
recommend acquiring new/more surface-to-air missiles, or new/more main-battle 
tanks.) 
Stage 3: Specific Capability Proposals, Including Major Capability 
Submissions 
Following approval by a senior defense committee of the generic options identified in 
Stage 2, the final step in the force development process is to determine specific solu-
tions and match available and envisaged future resources with force structure require-
ments. The questions involved at this stage concern cost, the type and numbers of spe-
cific platforms and/or systems envisaged, and the timing of procurement. Once these 
proposals/submissions are endorsed by political officials, they can be incorporated into 
the funding or programming process. 
Imperfections in the Methodology 
Perhaps because of its sui generis nature, Australian defense officials have long con-
ceded that their defense planning methodology fell slightly short of perfection. Simply 
trying to effect a full planning and execution cycle proved difficult. Like most planning 
systems, it was difficult to actually complete a full planning and execution cycle with-
out innumerable recommendations to improve the system being made midstream. In 
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consequence, some would argue that the value of the centrality of endorsed Strategic 
Concepts in providing overall direction to the force development process was never 
fully validated. It was also not an uncommon criticism to hear that Strategic Concepts 
were continuously being re-vetted before they could be fully validated by the planning 
system. In terms of methodological problems associated with Strategic Concepts, the 
following problematic aspects can be identified: 
• A tendency to exaggerate regional defense capabilities and the likely level of 
conflict (viz., a natural proclivity by some planners to interpret capabilities as 
“threats” and assume a worst-case scenario). 
• A paucity of mid-level ranking officers with the necessary analytical and 
methodological skills to develop these papers, particularly those capable of 
adopting a non-traditional approach. This is a clear caveat for PfP nations with 
limited civilian defense expertise. However, in the end, it is necessary to have 
such expertise—which must be insulated from outside influence—in order to al-
low them to base judgments on sound data. 
• The need to ensure that such a new and unique planning process as this one is re-
flected in national command and control arrangements, particularly as they relate 
to the sensitive issue of joint command concepts over traditional single-service 
ones. 
• The need to ensure that there is a strong and responsive process that links a Chief 
of Defense’s (CHOD’s) defense force’s operational preparedness guidance to 
Strategic Concepts and any other deliberate plans, which should include formal 
operation, concept and functional operation plans. 
• The need to ensure the provision (particularly costs) of adequate logistic support 
is factored into the planning process at the point where “capabilities” have been 
identified to accomplish required tasks.22 From a methodological perspective, 
whenever possible, such a logistics support assessment should take place early in 
the Defense Force Capability Options process. 
• The miscalculation on the part of some planners of the complexities and difficul-
ties likely to be confronted by a defense force when responding to low-level con-
                                                           
22 The lack of development of a methodological approach to the problem of logistically 
supporting the ADF in this force development process has been surprising. According to Air 
Marshal J. W. Newham, RAAF, Chief of Air Staff from 1985 to 1987, “In the Force Structure 
Committee we were trying to get a few extra Harpoon missiles to meet Navy’s ships’ outfits 
requirements, plus a few in reserve. The Assistant Secretary FDA [Force Development and 
Analysis Division] opined that, as we possessed 72 Harpoons, that would be sufficient to 
knock out all of the ships of all of the neighborhood navies, so we didn’t need any more. 
He’d overlooked that the 72 Harpoons were of little utility if locked away in ships’ maga-
zines deployed hither and thither around Australia. The weapons would not be available 
unless reserves were held and air launch kits were on hand.” See Australia’s Air Chiefs: The 
Proceedings of the 1992 RAAF History Conference (Canberra: RAAF Air Power Studies 
Centre, 14 October 1992), 67. 
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flict. In other words, such a level of conflict is likely to be manpower- and com-
bat-service-support intensive, as opposed to high-level conflicts requiring com-
plex and expensive combat capabilities. 
As regards Defense Force Capability Options papers, the following challenges have 
been identified by Australian defense planners: 
• Tasks are common to more than one role and, as such, these data need to be fac-
tored into the planning process. 
• The execution of tasks may require a joint service effort. This is important given 
that services tend to be individually funded. Therefore, service budgets need to 
be reflective of the potential need for “joint” capabilities. 
• At least in the early phases of the planning process, planners experienced some 
difficulty in establishing a direct link between these analyses and standing opera-
tional contingency plans. 
• The development of appropriate criteria for the capability/risk/cost trade-off (i.e., 
accurately defining acceptable performance standards that are based on metrics). 
• Producing objective capability-to-task analyses, so as to better to inform planners 
and officials in their decision-making. 
• The fact that many capabilities involve multiple roles, which leads to further 
complications in the capability-to-task analysis. 
Learning from Australia’s Experience 
One might conclude upon reading this brief overview of Australia’s defense planning 
and force development processes that both of these systems are simply intuitive. Such a 
judgment ignores the fact that the Australian Department of Defense was a pioneer in 
developing this planning method, and endeavored to ensure that it was the result of a 
careful attempt to derive force structure by logical, quantitative, and verifiable means. 
Officials went to great lengths to limit the extent to which simple judgments or prefer-
ences were accepted as facts that were based upon dispassionately derived data. In-
deed, these processes were not easily developed—it took a rather sophisticated politi-
cal and defense community twenty years of experimentation to reach a level of ade-
quate performance. Even today, this planning system is not without its shortcomings 
and, to their credit, Australian defense officials have long been candid in acknowledg-
ing weaknesses. Key elements of this discussion included institutional problems that 
impeded the methodology’s implementation and operation, and how they have been 
addressed, if not satisfactorily solved. Some particularly vexing problems in this regard 
have been: 
• Until the late 1980s, the defense community was often provided with insufficient 
or contradictory policy, strategy, and strategic guidance 
• The department of defense suffered from inadequate organizational structures 
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• The challenges posed by the perennial need to reconcile funding current tasks to 
achieve readiness with long-range planning requirements to ensure modernization 
and future advanced capabilities 
Lack of Guidance 
As surprising as it may seem, Australia’s official strategic thinking evolved slowly 
from the early 1970s onward.23 Between the publication of the 1972 defense white pa-
per and its 1987 counterpart, Australian defense planners were given at best incom-
plete (and oftentimes contradictory) guidance from political authorities.24 It took 
Dr. Paul Dibb (consultant to the then-Minister for Defense, Kim Beazley), and his 
seminal review of the ADF’s capabilities, to move the government toward articulating 
and sanctioning an official national-level strategy.25 The 1987 defense white paper pro-
vided unambiguous guidance, and the government comprehensively stated its national 
security aspirations and announced its strategy of “defense in depth.” The white paper 
had the effect of clearly limiting the Australian defense establishment’s force structure 
planning to the defense of Australia.26 
That said, as many defense planners in PfP member states can fully appreciate, in-
adequate or contradictory national-level policy and guidance can make developing co-
herent and integrated plans very difficult indeed. An example of how this lack of stra-
tegic guidance can adversely affect planning can be seen in institutional disagreements 
over the level of conflict for which the ADF should be structured. For instance, prior to 
the release of the 1987 white paper, the department’s civilian-led Force Development 
and Analysis Division (FDA) argued that the ADF should be structured for low-level 
contingencies—that is, to limit the options available to government by limiting capa-
bilities. The services, on the other hand, stressed the need to operate at the mid- to 
high-level end of the conflict spectrum (largely in conjunction with allies in multina-
tional formations). FDA was intent upon forcing the services to concentrate their de-
                                                           
23 See Australia, Department of Defense, Australian Defense Review (Canberra: AGPS, March 
1972), 6–10; 37–38; and idem, Australian Defense, November 1976 (Canberra: AGPS, 
1976), 10-14. Extracts of these important official documents can be found in Dibb, The Con-
ceptual Basis of Australia’s Defense Planning, 70–83.  
24 Dibb, Conceptual Basis, 49–52.  
25 See Dibb, Review of Australia’s Defense Capabilities, 25; 49–52. 
26 The Defense of Australia (1987), 31–32. It should be noted that I have written extensively 
critiquing this strategy and the policy of “self-reliance,” in that it seems inconceivable that 
defense planning should seek, in effect, to limit possible government options by limiting ca-
pabilities. See my review essay of Michael Evans’s The Tyranny of Dissonance: Australia’s 
Strategic Culture and Way of War, 1901-2005 (Canberra: Land Warfare Studies Centre, 
2005), in The Australian Army Journal 3:1 (Summer 2005-06): 241–47; and my paper, “The 
Nuanced Australian–U.S. Defense Relationship,” Presentation to the Woodrow Wilson In-





velopment efforts on building capabilities for the specific mission of the defense of 
northern Australia, while the services favored the procurement of “high-tech” capabili-
ties better suited for a “blue on red,” high-intensity conflict. Obviously, agreement 
upon which level of conflict will be most relevant to a country’s security requirements 
is critical in acquiring the appropriate capabilities to equip the force. In the case of 
Australia, this argument was only resolved with the publication of the 1987 defense 
white paper. 
Finally, in 1993, a review of the strategic basis of Australian security was com-
pleted: Strategic Review 1993. This document examined the global and regional 
changes affecting Australia’s defense, and identified and established a prioritized list 
of the principal current and foreseeable tasks of the ADF. Strategic Concepts were sub-
sequently revised or developed based upon the ensuing analysis and priorities gener-
ated by this policy document.27 While the existence of a stated strategy—“defense in 
depth,” as established in the 1987 defense white paper—went far in providing a 
framework for development that proved to be extremely useful to implementing plan-
ning based upon these Strategic Concepts, the lack of a similar level of clarity in es-
tablishing the ADF’s new roles and missions in achieving these new objectives had the 
effect of retarding the implementation of the force development process. As such, ini-
tial efforts to (re-)write Strategic Concepts floundered because they tended to be sin-
gle-service oriented. Subsequent to issuing Australia’s Strategic Planning in the 
1990s, the ADF adopted nine principal defense tasks in an attempt to develop jointly 
conceived Strategic Concepts. During this interim period, without any sanctioned stra-
tegic guidance, the services were forced to use levels of conflict as guidance.28 In es-
sence, the publications Australia’s Strategic Planning in the 1990s and Strategic Re-
view 1993 provided unquestionable government-endorsed policy and guidance to be 
employed in the initial phases of the force development process. 
One can thus see that it took a considerable amount of time before the Australian 
government was able to institute its novel defense planning and force development 
process. A key lesson from the Australian experience is that a top-down approach was 
required to overcome institutional opposition (in particular, from the individual ser-
vices) to implementing the planning process. The Australian experience also demon-
strates that, without recognized and accepted national-level government-endorsed 
guidance—policy, strategic, and financial—a top-down approach to defense planning 
is very difficult to execute in the presence of opposition from the services and other in-
stitutional stakeholders. However, it is also a mistake to conclude from this case study 
that formal documents are necessary to achieve such a planning methodology. Often-
times, national-level policy can be found in disparate sources, such as the constitution, 
defense laws, and speeches by senior civilian officials. It is the task of senior civilian 
defense officials to gather such guidance and integrate it in a usable form for planning 
purposes. 
                                                           
27 See Strategic Review 1993, 39–49. 
28 Briefing, Department of Defense, Russell Offices, Canberra, ACT, December 1992.  
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Inadequate Organizational Structures 
Prior to the reorganization of Headquarters Australian Defense Force (HQADF) in 
1990, the Australian defense organization was not well structured to implement a top-
down defense planning system. Until the latter half of the 1980s, the armed services 
were more or less modeled upon their American or British counterparts in key ele-
ments of their structure. As in most Western defense forces, little thought or effort had 
been directed to developing joint capabilities. Moreover, there was a clear predilection 
on the part of governments, and consequently planners, to direct resources to individ-
ual service combat capabilities, as opposed to developing joint capabilities and combat 
support, and combat service-support, formations. Hence, the Australian services were 
eminently well suited for combined operations alongside their allied counterparts when 
forward deployed and within larger allied formations, as opposed to conducting joint 
and integrated operations with other services from the Australian military, even within 
Australia. This force structure, while perhaps appropriate to the period of “Forward 
Defense” in the 1950s and 1960s (when Australian forces were deployed in Southeast 
Asia), was judged by civilian defense planners and some elected officials as being 
hopelessly ill-suited to support a new defense policy based upon the premise that de-
fending Australia proper was the top priority for the ADF, and should therefore drive 
its capability development.29 
Organizationally, the individual services retained considerable independence from 
the civilian side of the Department of Defense, including responsibilities for force de-
velopment.30 Indeed, until the consolidation of the civilian sections of the three ser-
vices into the Department of Defense in 1973, each service had its own individual de-
partment and minister! While the 1973 reorganization 31 has been referred to as the act 
that “civilianized” the Australian defense establishment, it still left many problems un-
solved.32 Most significant was that it left the services’ force development divisions in-
tact. In consequence, there ensued a lack of advance coordination between the civilian 
and military defense planning organizations, and a series of joint planning documents 
went largely ignored by the services.33 In fact, the services were often accused by civil-
ian defense planners of simply proposing block replacement of aging equipment, with-
out adequate consideration of their relevance to Australia’s defense needs. Indeed, as 
Dibb observed in 1986, 
                                                           
29 For example, see T. B. Millar, Australia’s Defense, 2nd ed. (Carlton, VIC: Melbourne 
University Press, 1969), 109–45. 
30 See The Management of Australia’s Defense, 301–2.  
31 Australia, Department of Defense, Australian Defense (Report on the Reorganization of the 
Defense Group of Departments, Presented to the Minister for Defense, Canberra, November 
1973).  
32 See Robert O’Neill, “Defense Policy,” in Australia in World Affairs, 1971–1975, ed. 
W. J. Hudson (Sydney: George Allen and Unwin, 1980), 24–25.  
33 See Wesley H. Schmidt, Jr., Planning Australia’s Defense Forces (Newport, RI: Department 
of National Security Decision Making, U.S. Naval War College, 14 March 1990), 195–96.  
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Force structure planning deficiencies have been compounded by the lack of a com-
prehensive military strategy and operational concepts for the defense of Australia. In 
the absence of more definitive guidance, each Service has developed its own plan-
ning. ...These documents are not coordinated with one another, nor do they necessar-
ily follow closely current strategic guidance. Some of their force structure objectives 
are unrealistic.34 
These organizational problems were addressed in 1990 following an important re-
view that restructured the HQADF. This headquarters, which had been established in 
1984 to serve as a joint staff, assumed greater authority through the creation of the po-
sition of Vice-Chief of the Defense Force, with responsibilities of coordinating force 
development and long-term planning activities, as well as an Assistant Chief of the De-
fense Force (Development), with resources drawn from the individual services.35 
Hence, when viewed in conjunction with the publication of key policy, planning, and 
strategy documents, the centralization of military force development responsibilities, 
along with the concentration of civilian expertise in the Force Development Division, 
established processes that were more conducive to a top-down approach to defense 
planning and force development. 
Reconciling Current Tasks with Long-Range Planning 
A problem that has long plagued Australia, and one that is surely familiar to NATO 
and PfP member nations, is the challenge of funding current operations while leaving 
adequate financial resources to acquire long-term capabilities. Moreover, despite their 
development of a rather sophisticated and structured planning system, Australian poli-
ticians and defense officials (the very ones who championed this planning system) have 
not been averse to bypassing the planning system to purchase weapon systems, thereby 
defeating the purpose of top-down planning.36 The need for farsighted defense invest-
ment is particularly important in Australia, which predicates its defense planning upon 
the critical assumption of sufficient warning time of a developing military threat in or-
der to activate its defense expansion base. The end of the Cold War combined with an 
extensive (and expensive) capital acquisition program launched in the mid-1980s to 
place the Department of Defense in the perennially difficult position of needing to fund 
                                                           
34 Dibb, Review of Australia’s Defense Capabilities, 27.  
35 See Australia, Department of Defense, Management Improvement and Manpower Policy 
Division, Report on the Implementation of the Structural Review of Higher ADF Staff Ar-
rangements (Canberra, 1 May 1990), 19–20.  
36 For example, the government’s decision in 1993 to purchase fifteen excess USAF F-111 air-
craft was made because they were a “good buy.” There was no need for these aircraft that had 
been validated by the planning system. See The Telegraph-Mirror (NSW), 30 June 1993; 
and The Sydney Morning Herald, 18 September 1993. 
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current operations while attempting to find ways to fund long-term capital acquisition 
projects.37 
As one can imagine, there is no simple answer to the conundrum of funding current 
and future activities in an environment of effectively diminishing resources. A review 
was conducted in 1990–91 to reexamine force development plans and priorities in the 
light of lower levels of funding than were anticipated in the 1987 white paper. One of 
the recommendations of this report, Force Structure Review 1991, was that the De-
partment of Defense adopted a ten-year planning system to complement the existing 
Five Year Defense Program.38 This new program’s envisaged purpose was to establish 
necessary longer-term priorities in order to better manage limited resources. While 
certainly not a panacea, the development of a ten-year development plan was judged 
somewhat useful in forcing the establishment of clear resource priorities. However, it 
should be noted that Australian defense officials discovered that an early problem de-
veloped in the utilization of this plan, in that it tended to endorse the block replacement 
of equipment, which is antithetical to the top-down planning process.39 Australian de-
fense officials felt that this issue would be resolved once Defense Force Capability 
Options Papers were sufficiently developed to provide a greater level of specificity to 
the ten-year development plan. 
The End of Capabilities-Based Planning? 
A number of unconnected events appear to have conspired to end, at least in a formal-
istic sense, the predominance of capabilities-based defense planning in Australia. First, 
the electoral defeat of the Australian Labor Party in 1996 by a conservative coalition 
might well have spelled the end of this planning methodology. Notwithstanding the 
impeccable pro-American credentials of the Labor government (in power since 1983), 
the new conservative coalition was elected on a platform of improving Australia’s de-
fense relationship with the United States. However, it was not until the commissioning 
of the Defense Efficiencies Review in 1997, and the adoption of its recommendations 
by the government—including the consolidation and amalgamation of offices within 
the Department of Defense and HQADF—that power relationships and priorities 
                                                           
37 For background on this issue see Graeme Cheeseman, “Over-reach in Australia’s Regional 
Military Policy,” in The New Australian Militarism: Undermining Our Future Security, ed. 
Graeme Cheeseman and St. John Kettle (Leichhardt, NSW: Pluto Press Australia, Ltd., 
1990), 73–92; and Thomas-Durell Young, “Problems in Australia’s ‘Defense Revolution,’” 
Contemporary Southeast Asia 11:3 (December 1989): 237–56. 
38 See Australia, Department of Defense, Force Structure Review 1991 (Canberra: AGPS, May 
1991).  
39 Briefing, Department of Defense, Russell Offices, Canberra, ACT, December 1992. 
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changed.40 Moreover, the priority to focus the nation’s finite defense resources on the 
“defense of Australia” was replaced by the need to fund capabilities geared toward 
peace-support operations, such as in East Timor, as well as to support coalition opera-
tions in support of the global war on terrorism. It is as yet sufficiently uncertain to con-
clude whether the planning methodology failed to meet the new policy requirements of 
the government, or that its implementers were unwilling to adapt it to the new policy 
environment, or that the new defense organization was incapable of executing the sys-
tem as previously organized. 
Conclusions 
This essay has described and analyzed how, notwithstanding difficulties and chal-
lenges, a defense force can be structured on a threat-ambiguous planning basis that re-
flects government guidance and macro-regional security considerations. The Australian 
experience has shown that, given proper government guidance on both policy/strategy 
and funding, a defense force can be developed to meet the objectives established by the 
government. Leaving aside the specific stages and details of the planning process, the 
Australian case reveals that a number of institutional and policy conditions are neces-
sary. Top-down planning is particularly dependent upon government guidance: policy 
leadership, strategic guidance, and financial direction. An appropriate institutional 
structure is also necessary in order for these directives to be implemented. The Austra-
lian experience demonstrates that, without these structures, the planning process be-
tween the individual services and the development office can be very contentious and, 
as a result, often ineffectual. Thus, the creation of a joint headquarters with adequate 
staffing, headed by a senior military officer, to work with the civilian defense force de-
velopment officials will also encourage success. One of the additional benefits of such 
a system is that it tends to encourage and facilitate the joint development of capabilities 
to meet endorsed tasks. 
Obviously, the Australian experience has not been without its own problems and 
shortcomings, the difficulty of combining the funding requirements of current tasks 
                                                           
40 The Force Structure Review recommended the adoption of an “integrated planning structure, 
… able to identify the capability consequences of changes to resource levels and … to de-
termine the longer term consequences of such changes for force capability.” Moreover, the 
review recommended the need to adopt “longer term planning so as to identify the factors 
that will shape the Defense Force of the future.” See Future Directions for the Management 
of Australia’s Defense, Addendum to the Report of the Defense Efficiency Review: Secre-
tariat Papers (Canberra, Directorate of Publishing and Visual Communications, Defense 
Centre Canberra, 1997, DPUBS: 27119/97), 21–25, particularly 23. See also Future Direc-
tions for the Management of Australia’s Defense, Report of the Defense Efficiency Review 
(Canberra: Directorate of Publishing and Visual Communications, Defense Centre Canberra, 
1997, DPUBS: 26975/97); see particularly E-4, recommendation R16: “The Concepts and 
Capabilities Committee, the Force Structure Policy and Programming Committee and the 
Defense Source Definition Committee should be disbanded and replaced with competent 
staff work and ad hoc meetings if necessary.”  
THE QUARTERLY JOURNAL 
 54
with long-term planning being only one example. However, this should not condemn 
the process itself. At a time when NATO and PfP nations are searching for convincing 
means to justify existing, let alone new, force structures, proposals based upon meth-
odologies that emphasize threat-ambiguous (or capabilities-based) rationales stand a 
greater likelihood of obtaining government support than arguments based upon other, 
more ephemeral rationales. To be sure, not every aspect of the Australian methodology 
may apply to all states. However, one could make a strong argument that the shifting of 
force development resources and responsibilities away from the individual services to a 
joint staff warrants consideration by most NATO and PfP member nations. What may 
be particularly valuable to some nations are certain elements of the Australian method-
ology that would increase the intellectual discipline and rigor of their planning proc-
esses. At bottom, the Australian methodology requires careful and systematic consid-
eration of what a defense force should be structured to do. It should imbue the defense 
planning process with an active and practical mentality in what has been, in many in-
stances, a reactive process, one that has been all too vulnerable to challenges by minis-
tries of finance in all too many NATO and PfP nations. 
In sum, the Australian experience offers insights into the planning process, suc-
cesses that other countries can duplicate, and mistakes that they can avoid replicating 
when introducing reforms to their defense planning methodologies. Without an identi-
fiable threat upon which to focus, defense planning in NATO and PfP nations is a 
“tough sell” to many politicians, and justifiably so. What responsible political leaders 
and civilian officials are increasingly demanding from military establishments are well-
reasoned justifications for military capabilities that meet stated requirements. A threat-
ambiguous planning process, based upon a review of the twenty-odd years of Austra-
lian successes and failures, might be a reasonable place to start developing such 
processes. 
